The law does not matter. It seems that just because someone makes a law we must follow it but why because were were told so by the NWO. F*ck them and their puppet courts they should be the ones hanging
Post by CHORNYVOLK on Jul 30, 2008 14:25:54 GMT -5
Bosnia, Hysteria Politics, and the Roots of International Terrorism
by Brendan O'Neill Since he was arrested in Belgrade last week, there have been miles and miles of newspaper commentary on Radovan Karadzic: on his bloody past; his role in Srebrenica; his bouffant; his limp handshake; his transformation from war leader to bearded hippy therapist. Yet perhaps the most interesting article â€“ or at least the most unwittingly revealing â€“ was a 374-word piece that appeared on the website of the UK Guardian on 25 July.
It was written by Inayat Bunglawala, Assistant Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and bÃªte noire of Britain's left-leaning "humanitarian militarists." Pro-war commentators despise Bunglawala because he supports Hamas, sympathizes with Iraqi suicide bombers, and, just prior to 9/11, he was disseminating the writings of Osama bin Laden, whom he described as a "freedom fighter."
In the ever-shrinking world of British dinner-party spats between humanitarian militarism on one hand and Islamism on the other, Bunglawala is considered the arch enemy of Britain's laptop bombardiers, who believe you can liberate Third World countries by writing a few outraged newspaper columns and dropping a few hundred bombs.
Yet in his Guardian comment on Karadzic, Bunglawala found himself siding with one of his staunchest critics amongst Britain's "muscular left." Under the headline "Lessons from the past," Bunglawala wrote: "I [have] finally managed to find something written by Martin Bright that I wholeheartedly agree with." Bright is the political editor of the New Statesman and is associated with Britain's liberal interventionist writers; he is also the author of a pamphlet titled "When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries," which attacked the British government for having links with Bunglawala's apparently "extreme" organization, the MCB.
What could Bunglawala and Bright possibly agree on? In Bunglawala's words, they agree that British schoolchildren should be taught about Srebrenica "in the same way that they are taught about Auschwitz," that Karadzic is evil, and that the Bosnian war was a lethal explosion of the Bosnian Serbs' "deadly hatred" which followed their "relentless vilification of entire communities" (presumably the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats).
In short? Both Bunglawala, the anti-Western political Islamist, and Bright, the leftish sympathizer with Western military intervention, see the Bosnian conflict in precisely the same way: not as a bloody civil war in which all sides committed atrocities, but as an episode of Nazi-style Serbian rampaging against vilified communities, which was comparable in its horror to Auschwitz.
Bunglawala's article was a fleeting but powerful reminder of a truth that is too often brushed under the carpet these days: namely, that both contemporary Western interventionism and contemporary radical Islamism have their origins in the Bosnian war. But back then, the "arch enemies" of the interventionism-vs-Islamism debate were allies. They took the same side (that of the Bosnian Muslims), propagandized wildly against the Serbs (whom they denounced as thugs, gangsters, dogs and even monkeys), demanded Western military assaults on Serb positions, and described the actions of the Serbs as uniquely barbaric, even Nazi-esque.
And both the Western militarists and radical Islamists were re-energized and moralized by their joint crusade against the Serbs in Bosnia. One might even argue that both of the major curses in international affairs today â€“ the militaristic meddling of Western governments that pose as humanitarian and the occasional bloody attacks launched by al-Qaeda and others â€“ spring from the anti-Serb hysteria of 1992-1995.
This goes way beyond a rare and polite agreement between Bunglawala and Bright. The capture of Karadzic is something that everyone from Bush to bin Laden will celebrate. Pretty much the only consensus that exists between the American military machine and the al-Qaeda network is that the Serbs are evil and deserving of punishment.
Following Karadzic's arrest, Richard Holbrooke, the US diplomat who negotiated the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, described him as "one of the worst men in the world, the Osama bin Laden of Europe." This is darkly ironic, since in the early and mid-1990s Holbrooke and bin Laden were on the same side, united in a violent campaign against Karadzic and the rest of the Bosnian Serbs. Holbrooke must remember this; in an interview in 2001 he said the Bosnian Muslims "wouldn't have survived" without the help of al-Qaeda militants.
Today's humanitarian militarists and Islamic radicals are cut from the same cloth. In Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, they were close allies â€“ propagandistic, moralistic and militaristic allies. During the Bosnian war, anywhere between 1,200 and 3,000 Arab Mujahideen, many of them veterans of the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, descended on Bosnia to fight alongside the Bosnian Muslims. And their movement into Bosnia was facilitated by the new "humanitarians" in Washington.
In 1993 and 1994, the Clinton administration gave a green light to Iran, Saudi Arabia and various highly dubious radical Islamic charities to arm the Bosnian Muslims. Despite having denounced Iran as "the worst sponsor of terrorism in the world," the Clinton administration told both Croat and Bosnian Muslim leaders that they should accept shipments of weapons, ammunition, antitank rockets, communications equipment and uniforms and helmets from Iran.
Washington also allowed "Islamic charities," which really were radical Mujahideen-based organizations, to supply money and arms to the Bosnian Muslims. As the Washington Post reported in September 1996, US officials on the ground in Bosnia, who were motivated by "sympathy for the Muslim government and ambivalence about maintaining the arms embargo," instructed other Western officials to "back off" and "not interfere" with these shipments from radical Islamists. One of the "charities" whose provision of funds and arms to the Bosnian Muslims was protected by American diplomats was run by Osama bin Laden.
The US-protected supply line between the Middle East and Bosnia, through which both Iranian elements and radicals sent money and guns, also encouraged Mujahideen to make their way into the Balkans. Along with the flow of radical Islamist weaponry, there followed the movement of radical Islamist warriors.
Once inside Bosnia, these Mujahideen, many of them fresh from the bloody battlefields of Afghanistan, fought with the Bosnian Muslim Army at a time when it was being supported politically and militarily by Washington and vast numbers of Western liberal commentators. In 1994 and 1995, Washington surreptitiously supplied the Bosnian Muslim Army with weapons and training, even though it had hundreds of Mujahideen in its ranks. The Mujahideen formed a battalion of holy warriors which was, according to Evan Kohlmann, author of Al-Qaeda's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, directly answerable to then Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.
If the radical Islamists who flooded Bosnia were militarily backed by Washington, they were propagandistically inspired by the Western liberal media.
The similarities between the positions of the liberal hawks in newsrooms across America and Europe and the line taken by al-Qaeda militants were striking. As the British author Philip Hammond argues, hawkish journalists in the Western press depicted the war as "a simple tale of good versus evil." Likewise, Kohlmann describes how Mujahideen who fought in Bosnia believed there was a "clear divergence between good and evil" and understood the conflict "in terms of an apocalyptic, one-dimensional religious confrontation between Muslims and non-Muslims." Western journalists labeled the Serbs "thugs" and "gangsters"; the Independent newspaper in Britain even published a cartoon showing them as monkeys. The Mujahideen labeled them "dogs" and "infidels."
Indeed, many of the Mujahideen who fought in Bosnia were inspired to do so by simplistic media coverage of the sort written by liberal-left journalists in the West. Many of the testimonies made by Arab fighters reveal that they first ventured to Bosnia because they "saw US media reports on rape camps" or read about the "genocide" in Bosnia and the "camps used by Serb soldiers systematically to rape thousands of Muslim women." Holy warriors seem to have been moved to action by some of the more shrill and unsubstantiated coverage of the war in Bosnia.
In his book Landscapes of the Jihad, Faisal Devji argues that contemporary jihad "is more a product of the media than it is of any local tradition or situation and school or lineage of Muslim authority... [The] jihad itself can be seen as an offspring of the media, composed as it is almost completely of preexisting media themes, images and stereotypes." The jihad in Bosnia was in many ways a "product of the media" â€“ many Mujahideen were inspired to fight by media "images", and they executed their violent attacks against media "stereotypes": wicked Serbs.
Most strikingly, perhaps, both Western liberals and the Eastern Mujahideen ventured to Bosnia in response to their own crises of legitimacy, and in search of a sense of purpose. As Adam Burgess says of sections of the Western left in his book Divided Europe: "Deprived of the traditional staples of left-wing politics, the search for an alternative became increasingly pronounced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The left embraced new causes such as environmentalism, which were traditionally associated with a more conservative orientation. It is in this context that sense can be made of the readiness of the left to embrace the anti-Serbian 'cause' with less restraint and qualification than even the rest of society."
Similarly, the Mujahideen embraced the anti-Serbian "cause" because they too had lost direction. In the early 1990s, Afghanistan was becoming bogged down in civil war after the withdrawal of the Soviets, and governments in the Middle East and north Africa were persecuting veteran Mujahideen returning from Afghanistan and wiping out radical Islamic groups. For both Western liberals (governments and thinkers) and the Mujahideen, Bosnia became a refuge from these harsh realities, a place where they could fight fantasy battles against evil to make themselves feel dynamic and heroic instead of having to face up to the real problems in their movements and in politics more broadly.
Bosnia had a key transformative effect on both the Western liberal establishment and the Arab Mujahideen. It was the conflict that made many in the West pro-interventionist, convincing them that the "international community" must ignore sovereign norms and intervene around the world to save people from tyranny. And it transformed the Mujahideen from religious nationalists â€“ who during the Afghan-Soviet war possessed "no global blueprint transcending their individual countries" â€“ into global warriors against "evil," who also, like their humanitarian paymasters, began to care little for old-fashioned ideas about sovereignty. It is after Bosnia that we see the emergence of international networks of Islamic militants.
In Bosnia, both Western elements and radical Islamists became super-moralized, militarized, internationalized. As a result of their joint war against the "evil" of the Serbs, they began to conceive of themselves as warriors for "good" who did not have to play by the old rules of the international order. Post-Bosnia, Western governments, backed by numerous commentators, launched "humanitarian" wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq â€“ and Islamic militants who trained in Bosnia were involved in the African Embassy bombings of 1998, the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid train bombings of 2004.
There is nothing so bitter as a conflict between former allies. We should remind ourselves that much of today's bloody moral posturing between Western interventionists and Islamic militants â€“ which has caused so much destruction around the world â€“ springs from the hysterical politics of "good and evil" that was created during the Bosnian war. No doubt Karadzic has a great deal to answer for. But the West/East, liberal/Mujahideen demonization of Karadzic and the Serbs, and through it the rehabilitation of both Western militarism and Islamic radicalism, has also done a great deal to destabilize international affairs and destroy entire communities.
Post by CHORNYVOLK on Jul 31, 2008 14:49:24 GMT -5
Bosnia's Problem Itself by Nebojsa Malic A fascinating media phenomenon could be observed last week, following the arrest of Radovan Karadzic, wartime leader of the Bosnian Serbs. Anyone who was even tangentially involved in the 1990s events in Bosnia rushed forth to offer their thoughts; ex-diplomats and politicians, journalists and commentators used Karadzic's capture as an opportunity to remind the world not so much of the tragedy of Bosnia, but of their role in it. For all of their talk about the "Bosnian victims" and humanitarian compassion and "bombs for peace," the braying choir of self-righteous phonies made it obvious it was all about them. Everyone who had, in Chris Deliso's immortal phrase, invested heavily in the Bank of Collective Serbian Guilt, showed up to claim a dividend.
Politics of Fear
The most facetious displays of self-aggrandizement dressed themselves up in the cloak of concern. It did not take long for the BBC, for example, to claim that Karadzic's arrest "casts a shadow over Bosnia's fate." Even though just last week it was argued that the Inquisition's capture of the Bosnian Serb leader was a "triumph" over nationalism, it has all of a sudden become a boost to the nationalists!
An exemplary prophet of gloom was Paddy Ashdown. This former viceroy of Bosnia claimed on the pages of the Observer on Sunday that "there is a real threat of Bosnia breaking up again." He pointed the finger squarely at the Serb Republic ("Karadzic's creation") and its Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, charging him with "aggressively reversing a decade of reforms." Said Ashdown:
"He has set up the parallel institutions and sent delegations to Montenegro to find out how they broke away. He has used the autonomy granted by the Dayton Agreement to undermine the Bosnia Dayton envisaged."
Those who know Bosnia, of course, find it hard to take baronet Norton-sub-Hamdon seriously. These are the exact same things he used to say when he ruled Bosnia (2002-2006) as a personal fiefdom, serving as the living embodiment of Lord Acton's dictum. He was wrong then, and he is wrong now.
What sort of Bosnia was envisioned at Dayton, exactly? The agreement achieved at the U.S. airbase in Ohio in November 1995 ended the civil war by establishing a loose federation between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina," with a minimal central government granted strictly limited powers. An international envoy, called "High Representative," was appointed to oversee the agreement's implementation.
However, in 1997 the "Peace Implementation Council" â€“ composed of Western countries that backed the Dayton agreement â€“ expanded the authority of the HR, making him a de facto dictator of the country. These "Bonn powers" were subsequently used to summarily dismiss elected officials, impose laws, change boundaries, create new entities (Brcko District), and effect "reforms" in the name of Dayton â€“ even though the Dayton Constitution never actually authorized any of this. Then again, when has a "goddamn piece of paper," be it the one from Philadelphia or the one from Ohio, ever stopped those that crave power?
Further complicating things was that the warring factions in Bosnia perceived Dayton differently. For the country's Serbs and Croats, it was the vindication of their wartime goal to secure territorial autonomy and protection from Muslim domination. For many Muslims, however, it was a temporary setback to the dream of a centralized, unified state they could dominate through superior numbers. Fighting may have ended in 1995, but the subsequent Bosnian politics was, to paraphrase Clausewitz, war by other means. Efforts to centralize Bosnia under the viceroys inevitably played into the hands of Muslim nationalists, even as Serb and Croat nationalists were blamed for all the ills that still plagued the country.
Ashdown talks about how Dodik's actions go against the "Bosnia Dayton envisaged." Even a cursory reading of the actual agreement, though, is enough to conclude precisely the opposite. It was in fact the succession of viceroys that claimed to pursue the "spirit" of Dayton, contrary to its letter. The protesting Serbs and Croats were simply told, "I am altering the deal; pray I do not alter it further."
The Better Half
Just a day after Ashdown's article in the Observer, however, an unlikely rebuttal appeared. Writing on the Guardian's online op-ed board, Ian Bancroft argued that "Ashdown's scaremongering about [Bosnia's] future misses the real reasons for the state's fragility":
"From the fiscal frailty of [the Federation] to persistent discord amongst Bosnia's Croats, the country is beset by a number of other structural vulnerabilities that cannot be blamed on the country's Serbs."
While the government of Milorad Dodik that Ashdown so reviles has actually made the Serb Republic more prosperous and business-friendly, the Federation is almost broke. As Dodik himself described it to the Belgrade daily Politika this past weekend,
"The Serb Republic has a budget surplus; we have 1.3 million marks (650,000 Euros) in just the development fundâ€¦ Our public spending is 36.7%... Our GDP is rising by 8% this year. In the Federation, their public spending is 63%, and their taxes are much higher. Our income taxes are 48%, and in the Federation they are 61%. Our corporate tax is 10%, compared to 30% in the Federationâ€¦ We are the better half of Bosnia â€“ why else would 427 companies from the Federation transfer their headquarters here, and become our taxpayers? Croat politicians dismiss the Federation as â€˜charity state,' because most of its budget goes to welfare payments."
And this is without mentioning the millions of dollars in foreign aid that disappeared since 1996â€¦
But this isn't just about the money. Bancroft's most devastating criticism of Ashdown implies that the former viceroy fundamentally misunderstood Dayton: "The pillars of the Dayton Agreement are group rights and autonomy, not centralization and the creation of a unitary system" The EU operates on the principle of subsidiarity, yet refuses to implement it in Bosnia! It boggles the mind.
Against the Official Truth
Bancroft's criticism of Ashdown â€“ indeed, of Empire's entire approach to the post-war Bosnia â€“ is not the only one that dared burst the official bubble of self-serving propaganda, hatred and fear-mongering, inspired by Karadzic's arrest. Two other essays appeared last week, challenging the dominant narrative of the Bosnian war and the perceived role of the West in it.
At the Brussels Journal, John Laughland explained the true war aims of the Bosnian Serbs, and described the commonly accepted story of aggression and genocide as "absurd." As if anticipating the argument Bancroft would make several days later, Laughland identified the issue crucial for peace in Bosnia:
"The Muslims continue to claim control over the whole of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Serbs merely want the preservation of their considerable autonomy within it."
But if the tropes of aggression and genocide are so evidently absurd, why did the West go along with them? Mick Hume at Spiked argues that it was a matter of self-absorbed projection. As the Cold War ended, activists in the West sought "salvation and a new sense of moral purpose" in a Balkans crusade:
"Journalists and politicians talked about Bosnia as â€˜our Poland' or even â€˜our generation's Holocaust', the battle against the Serbs as â€˜our Second World War', a chance to emulate their fathers' noble fight against the Nazis.
"To justify this cause they had to turn the complex civil war in the former Yugoslavia into a simple act of genocide by [Serbs]."
Now that Iraq has punctured the bubble of interventionism, "The notion that they were taking a stand against the new Nazis in Bosnia and Kosovo has become just about the only thing the pro-interventionists can hold on to as proof that they are on the side of right."
A Myth, Serving a Lie
A clear, if disturbing, picture emerges at last. The myth of the Bosnian war was invented by those who sought to profit from it, and expanded until it overrode reality itself. The actual suffering and subsequent troubles of Bosnians â€“ be they Muslim, Serb, Croat or anyone else â€“ never really factored into any of this, except when they made good copy, sound bite, or TV clip.
Bosnia's real problem is that its communities cannot agree on whether they should live together at all, much less how; but they will never have a chance to even start meaningful dialogue so long as the Empire uses the myth of Bosnia to justify its tyranny of good intentions.
Post by CHORNYVOLK on Jul 31, 2008 14:55:27 GMT -5
The Plight of the Bosnian Serbs From the desk of John Laughland on Wed, 2008-07-23 15:15
The arrest of Radovan Karadzic in Serbia on Tuesday has provided yet another occasion for all the tired old propaganda about the Balkans wars to be taken out of the cupboard and given one last airing. In particular, the war is presented as one between a Serb aggressor and an innocent victim, the Bosnian Muslims, and the former is accused of practising genocide against the latter. Even if one accepts that crimes against humanity were committed during the Balkan wars, it should be obvious that both these claims are absurd.
First, the Serbs were no more the aggressors in the Bosnian civil war than Abraham Lincoln was an aggressor in the American Civil War. The Yugoslav army was in place all over Bosnia-Herzegovina because that republic was part of Yugoslavia. Bosnian Muslims (like Croats) left the army in droves and set up their own militia instead, as part of their drive for independence from Belgrade. This meant that the Yugoslav army lost its previous strongly multiethnic character and became largely Serb. It did not mean that Serb forces entered the territory of Bosnia, or even that the Serbs attacked the hapless Bosnian Muslims.
The accusation of aggression is intended to introduce by the back door an allegation which in fact has vanished from modern international criminal justice. Although the crime of waging an aggressive war was pronounced to be the supreme international crime at Nuremberg, it has been dropped from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia which will presumably try Karadzic once he is extradited to The Hague, and even the new International Criminal Court (also in The Hague) does not for the time being have jurisdiction over it.
The accusation has the effect of condemning the Bosnian Serb war effort at its very origins (in terms of ius ad bellum) independently of any condemnation for the way the war was fought (ius in bello). In fact, the Bosnian Serb war effort was no more or less legitimate than the Bosnian Muslim war effort. The Muslims wanted to secede from Yugoslavia (and were egged on to do this by the Americans and the Europeans) while the Bosnian Serbs wanted to stay in Yugoslavia. It was as simple as that.
In any case, once the Muslims had seized power in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serbs sought not to conquer the whole republic but instead simply to fight for the secession of their territories from Muslim control. Of course atrocities were committed against civilians during this period, especially ethnic cleansing. But the same phenomenon is observed, I believe, and by definition, in every single war in which a new state is created, whether it is the creation of Pakistan in 1947 or the creation in 1974 of what later became the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. If the Muslims had the right unilaterally to secede from Yugoslavia, why should the Bosnian Serbs not have had the right unilaterally to secede from the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina which had never before existed and a state, and to which the Bosnian Serbs had no loyalty whatever?
Second, the Bosnian Serbs are accused (and two have been convicted) of committing genocide against the Bosnian Muslims in the massacre perpetrated at Srebrenica. Let us leave aside for a moment the Serb claims that the numbers of people killed in that summer of 1995 has been artificially inflated for propaganda purposes; let us also leave aside the undoubted fact that the Bosnian Muslims were using the UN safe haven of Srebrenica as a safe haven from which to conduct constant attacks against the Serb villages surrounding the town, during which many atrocities were committed against Serb civilians. (The commander of the Muslim forces, Nasir Oric, was released by the ICTY in February.)
What is clear is that the Srebrenica massacre cannot possibly be described as genocide. Even the most ardent pro-Muslim propagandists agree that the victims of the massacre there were all men. The Bosnian Serbs claim that they were combatants (although that is certainly not an excuse for killing them) but the point is that an army bent on genocide would precisely not have singled out men for execution but would have killed women too. The Srebrenica massacre may well have been a crime against humanity but it is impossible to see how it can be categorised as genocide.
Unfortunately, there is a very clear political reason why it has been so categorised. The Muslim president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silaijdzic, said carefully on CNN the day Karadzic was captured that Karadzicâ€™s trial was only the beginning of the process by which justice would be done in Bosnia. He said that there were hundreds of thousands of Muslims who had been ethnically cleansed by â€œKaradzic and Milosevicâ€ and that their project therefore remained in force. The clear implication of what he was saying was this: if the very existence of the Bosnian Serb republic (the autonomous region within Bosnia carved out from the republic during the civil war) is found, in a court of law, to have been had as its president a man, Karadzic, who is convicted of genocide in the process of creating it, then its status would be illegitimate and it should be abolished. The Muslims continue to claim control over the whole of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Serbs merely want the preservation of their considerable autonomy within it.
In other words, far from bringing peace to the Balkans, it is quite possible that a conviction of Karadzic for genocide will reopen the Dayton settlement and egg the Muslims on to claim control over the Serb republic too. Under such circumstances, it is inevitable that the Bosnian Serbs would try to proclaim formal secession from Bosnia, just as the Kosovo Albanians did from Serbia.
Post by CHORNYVOLK on Jul 31, 2008 14:57:33 GMT -5
The post-Karadzic world Lord Ashdown's scaremongering about Bosnia and Herzegovina's future misses the real reasons for the state's fragility
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Ian Bancroft guardian.co.uk, Monday July 28 2008 Article history Lord Ashdown's warning about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina â€“ which was intended to rouse Europe's capitals from their "comfortable slumber" â€“ certainly dampened the optimism that accompanied last week's arrest of Radovan Karadzic.
However, in attributing the problems facing Bosnia and Herzegovina to the actions of Bosnia's Serbs, Lord Ashdown overlooked â€“ intentionally or not â€“ several broader issues that continue to undermine the state's viability. From the fiscal frailty of one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to persistent discord amongst Bosnia's Croats, the country is beset by a number of other structural vulnerabilties that cannot be blamed on the country's Serbs. The weakness of the international community does not lie in its approach towards the other entity, Republika Srpska, as Lord Ashdown tacitly asserts. Instead, it stems from the failure to tackle the Federation's current instability and the rhetoric calling for the dissolution of Republika Srpska which, like any talk of secession, violates the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Contrary to Lord Ashdown's claims that Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, is "now aggressively reversing a decade of reforms", Republika Srpska has engaged in a plethora of socio-economic reforms designed to improve the entity's business environment by streamlining bureaucracy and cutting tax. As a result, it has benefited from privatisation deals, encouraged substantial foreign direct investment and now maintains a healthy budget surplus.
In comparison, overly generous payments to war veterans have left the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the verge of bankruptcy. Only &â‚¬;221 remained in its treasury at the end of May. What the International Monetary Fund describes as a 'liquidity squeeze' has led to lower then expected budget revenues. Financial instability in the Federation has damaging ramifications for the economic prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, deterring investors from an already challenging environment.
The Federation's fiscal and political problems have further destabilised the status of Bosnia's Croats. The Croatian prime minister, Ivo Sanader, recently described their situation as Bosnia and Herzegovina's main problem. Many of Bosnia's Croats want a 'third entity' as a means to secure equality within Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the debate about constitutional reform set to be reignited in the autumn, the Croat question will resurface.
The arrest of Karadzic has prompted another outpouring of rhetoric that reinforces this sense of fragmentation â€“ a sense that has been particularly apparent since a US-proposed constitutional reform package was rejected by Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina two years ago. The current chairman of the BiH presidency, Silajdzic has again called into question the existence of Republika Srpska. Sulejman Tihic, president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), unitary system. As Sumantra Bose writes, "the 'multiethnic' and apparently 'civic' vision of integration in post-war BiH is an attention-seeking device for some sectarian Bosniak political elements who want to appear 'liberal' to westerners". While more reforms are needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the economic and administrative spheres, Europe's various experiences demonstrate that it is neither necessary nor always viable to centralise decision-making. The principle of subsidiarity, commonplace throughout Europe, should also be applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Lord Ashdown is right to say that "it is always more difficult, especially in the Balkans, to defend the preservation of multi-ethnic spaces and resist the creation of mono-ethnic ones". But Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence â€“ and subsequent recognition by a number of EU states â€“ has undermined the idea of preserving multi-ethnic spaces. The international community's view that Kosovo is a unique case without precedent is not shared by critics of the selective and inconsistent application of the right to self-determination throughout the region.
If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to have a sustainable and prosperous future, its structural shortcomings must be prioritised over Lord Ashdown's scaremongering about Republika Srpska. Until RS is accepted â€“ however reluctantly by some â€“ as an integral part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, centrifugal political forces will continue to prevail over compromise, concession and re-integration. Only then, and with the necessary reforms in the Federation, can Bosnia and Herzegovina hope to reach its goal of joining the EU.
Prague, Aug 2 (CTK) - A banner supporting former Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who was recently arrested on suspicion of war crimes, appeared among the fans of Sparta Praha club at the stadium during the Czech first league's opening match Sparta vs Mlada Boleslav Saturday.
The banner reading "Mladic, Karadzic, hold on! You will not divide the Slavs, death to the EU!" also expressed support for former Serbian general Ratko Mladic.
The match organisers did not react to the situation.
Sparta spokesman Jakub Otava said the club would solve the situation with representatives of the hard core fans in the days to come.
Sparta has faced problems over banners and slogans of its fans for years. It usually pays high fines mainly over racist offences during the European cups matches.
Sparta has faced problems over banners and slogans of its fans for years. It usually pays high fines mainly over racist offences during the European cups matches.
I don't like football but the banners are usually amusing. Over here it's mostly Slovakia vs. Hungary banners. Quite impressive though that they chose Karadžić.
I really like the part: The banner reading "Mladic, Karadzic, hold on!" "You will not divide the Slavs, death to the EU!" i think it is really positive for us Slavic nationalists!!!
I Hope our Slovak football improves, but it must be amusing watching Hungary play so bad and loose all the time, majority of die hard Slovak football fans must jumping up and down on the stands laughing at the Hungarians. This season i am going to follow the Slovak League better, if you have any links to the league it would be greatly appreciated, i hope Slovan Bratislava do well, my Dad had a trial with them when he was young.
TsarSamuil: Browser is up, but I was doing other things..
Oct 12, 2020 18:58:52 GMT -5
Slavatar: OK.. Regards.
Oct 13, 2020 8:39:57 GMT -5
славянин: зиг хайль
Oct 22, 2020 15:41:37 GMT -5
славянин: дойчен зальдатен
Oct 22, 2020 15:41:56 GMT -5
Milo I.: Deutscher Sauerbraten?
Oct 28, 2020 9:59:34 GMT -5
White Cossack: Who's the best state leader currently?
Dec 6, 2020 8:57:53 GMT -5
TsarSamuil: Viktor Orban?
Dec 8, 2020 5:55:50 GMT -5
Gopnik: from leader's POV, i'd say Kim Jong Un as in north korea he is not forcing any pics of himself nor making a shit ton of songs praising him unlike his dad and grandfather, but instead he is attempting to get the nation out of the shithole it is in today.
Dec 13, 2020 17:16:43 GMT -5
Gopnik: but 1000000% not kim from a citizen's point of view, the Camps in North Korea are horrible.
Dec 13, 2020 17:18:52 GMT -5
White Cossack: You're both right, fellas.
Dec 18, 2020 11:17:53 GMT -5
eternal jew: indeed goys
Dec 18, 2020 12:13:55 GMT -5